Original Article

Discursive Articulation and Thirdspace Production in the Contestation of Residential Space along the Dupak Magersari Railway Line in Surabaya

Galang Geraldy[1][✉], Dwi Windyastuti[2], Muhammad Asfar[3]

[1,2,3]University of Airlangga, Surabaya

Correspondence Author: Galang.geraldy-2022@fisip.unair.ac.id

Abstract:

This study aims to analyse how residential space along the Dupak Magersari railway line in Surabaya is produced through a dialectical process of discursive articulation that shapes the negotiation of spatial meaning. Using the frameworks of discursive hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe), spatial production (Lefebvre), and Thirdspace (Soja), this study positions space not merely as a physical entity, but as a field of contestation over definitions, legitimation, and regimes of truth. This qualitative research with a case study approach utilises observation, in-depth interviews, and analysis of policy documents and media. Findings show that the dominant discourse of the state and corporations—which positions the railway border as an illegal, risky zone, devoid of residential function—is confronted by a counter-discourse that emphasises social legitimacy, sustainability of life, and the right to space. This contestation is mediated by formal local political actors, particularly the Regional Representative Council and the Surabaya City Government, which function as important nodes in discursive negotiations between the legal-administrative framework and citizens' demands for legitimacy. At the same time, the presence of communities, academics, and urban social networks expands the field of articulation, not as a centre of hegemony, but as a reality that enriches the discursive ecosystem of space. Through the formation of chains of equivalence, the discourse of "illegality" undergoes a dislocation of meaning and is contested by the narrative of "socially legitimate living space". This process produces a new nodal point that redefines the railway boundary not merely as an object of state control, but as a space whose meaning is negotiated. This contestation does not produce a final resolution between legal and illegal, but rather forms a Thirdspace—a hybrid space that lives in discursive tension and reconciliation. This study affirms that the dynamics of space at the railway boundary are a hegemonic battle over the meaning of space that transcends the technocratic framework of urban planning, and highlights the importance of discourse articulation in the production of

contemporary urban space.

Introduction

Following colonisation, cities in developing countries underwent structural transformation due to high population growth, rural-urban migration, industrialisation, and urban economic expansion that was not matched by the state's capacity to provide formal housing for low-income groups (Gilbert & Gugler, 2002; Parnell & Robinson, 2012). This accelerated urbanisation has triggered uncontrolled urban sprawl, an increase in housing deficits, and inequality in access to land and urban infrastructure (UN-Habitat, 2016; Neuwirth, 2005). In many developing cities, the spatial production system tends to favour the logic of capital accumulation—encouraging land commercialisation, evictions, and spatial fragmentation—while the urban poor are pushed into residual spaces that are not fully regulated or recognised (Harvey, 2003; Leaf, 2015; Shatkin, 2017).

This spatial inequality results in conditions of spatial informality, where part of the population lives outside the regulatory planning regime, not solely by choice, but as a result of policy structures that exclude them from the allocation of formal space (Roy, 2005; Meth, 2010). This situation gives rise to grey spaces, which are ambiguous spaces between the formal and illegal domains; normatively categorised as "illegal", but in fact tolerated, negotiated, and even relied upon as a survival mechanism for the urban poor (Roy, 2005, 2009; Yiftachel, 2009; de Soto, 2000). Grey spaces are not merely informal residential areas, but rather the product of selective, political, and layered spatial governance, in which the state is not entirely absent, but rather present in an inconsistent manner—between tolerance, control, and situational criminalisation (Yiftachel, 2009; Porter, 2011; Roy, 2009).

This phenomenon also represents what is known as urbanism of the poor, namely urban expansion driven by the spatial practices of marginalised groups through survival strategies, claims to space, and forms of informal economy that form the foundation of urban circulation itself (Bayat, 2000; Roy, 2005). In the absence of state intervention in managing the distribution of urban space to provide adequate housing, the urban poor have developed survival mechanisms based on land occupation, community solidarity, micro-economies, and independent infrastructure, which often serve as alternatives to the formal system (Davis, 2006; Simone, 2004; de Soto, 2000). Several studies explore the findings of this settlement model, such as the favela settlements in Rio de Janeiro, which show that informal settlements are not only residential spaces but also arenas for social negotiation and claims to urban citizenship (insurgent citizenship) that continue to transform amid the power relations of the state and the market (Holston, 2008; Perlman, 2010). In São Paulo, the practice of land occupation by the sem-teto movement confirms that informality does not represent an anomaly in development, but rather a logical manifestation of the structural exclusion of housing policy (Caldeira, 2017; Rolnik, 2013). In India, the Dharavi slum in Mumbai shows that slums are not merely marginal spaces, but productive economic ecosystems that support urban production chains, as well as spaces that are subject to intense negotiation between authorities, capital, and local communities (McFarlane, 2008; Arputham, J.,2010; Weinstein, 2014). Similarly, in

Delhi, squatter settlements show how the state exercises a "politics of unmapping" to maintain flexible control over informal spaces (Ghertner, 2011; Bhan, 2016).

Meanwhile, in Africa, townships and informal settlements in Cape Town, South Africa, represent the historical continuity of spatial segregation during the apartheid era, which has transformed into new inequalities under the neoliberal urban regime (Huchzermeyer, 2011; Miraftab, 2009). Meanwhile, in Nairobi, Kenya, the Kibera settlement has developed as an example of how informal communities create parallel systems for the provision of basic services in the absence of the state (infrastructural improvisation) (Gandy, 2006; Mutisya & Yarime, 2011). A similar phenomenon also occurs in Southeast Asia, where urban villages have become a collective response to exclusive urban modernisation. In Bangkok, informal settlements along canal banks developed through pragmatic and fluid community negotiation strategies with the state (Archer, 2012; Boonyabancha, 2005). In Manila, the estero community demonstrated the dynamics between the threat of eviction and strategies for claiming space based on the solidarity of the urban poor (Kusaka, 2017; Porio, 2012). Several studies confirm that informal spaces are not merely residues of development, but arenas of political claims, resistance, and space production that construct alternative urbanism systems outside the technocratic concepts of the state (Lefebvre, 1991; Roy, 2005; Yiftachel, 2009; Holston, 2008).

These situations provide an important comparative context for understanding the reality of Indonesia, particularly the settlements along the Dupak Magersari railway line in Surabaya. If we trace the historical periodisation, the process of producing this settlement space can be seen in three interrelated phases. The first phase (1950–1970) was the initial occupation of land along the railway line as a direct implication of rapid post-independence urban migration, the state's limited capacity to implement agrarian reform, the nationalisation of colonial land and assets, and the ideological battle for political legitimacy over space (Handinoto, 1996; Colombijn, 2013; Basundoro, 2016). Surabaya, as a centre of industrialisation and a major port, became an urban magnet, while the state did not yet have a system for providing housing for the urban poor. Many vacant spaces, including state-owned land, railway assets, riverbanks and railways, became targets for collective occupation as a survival strategy (Handinoto, 1996; Colombijn & Coté, 2015). During this period, urban space was not only a place to live, but also a field for the political consolidation of the poor, which was infiltrated by the dynamics of national ideological polarisation between left-wing and right-wing forces, including the influence of progressive mass organisations in advocating for urban villages (Basundoro, 2013; Fakih, 2001).

The second phase (1970–1998/2000s) was characterised by expansionist modernisation under the New Order's developmental state regime, when urban development required modern aesthetics, spatial rationalisation, and infrastructure as symbols of national progress (Kusno, 2000; Silver, 2008). Spatial production was formulated through technocratic logic that positioned poor neighbourhoods as anomalies of modernity, encouraging what was termed urban cleansing and social channelling—namely, the relocation of the poor to peripheral or residual spaces (Kusno, 2010; Basundoro, 2013; Harms, 2016). In Surabaya, the practices of village control, river normalisation, road widening, and zoning regulations have become instruments of spatial ordering that often place poor residents in a semi-illegal status and unequal relations vis-à-vis the state (Silas, 1992; Setiawan, 2010). Nevertheless, kampungs have developed social defence mechanisms based on solidarity, informal

subsistence systems, and the strengthening of communal identity as political capital to delay or negotiate evictions (Silas, 1992; Setiawan, 2010; Hellman, 2012).

The third phase (1998–present) took place within the orbit of reform and decentralisation, which opened up new space for the articulation of rights to space through local initiatives, the emergence of urban citizen movements, and the fragmentation of institutional authority in urban spatial governance. In this phase, urban spatial planning no longer operates in a fully centralised manner, but is negotiated through more pluralistic power relations between local governments, state corporations and community groups (Firman, 2009; Hudalah & Firman, 2012). Law No. 26 of 2007 on Spatial Planning and Law No. 23 of 2007 on Railways became the formal legal basis that substantively prohibited buildings on railway boundaries. Within this framework, spatial planning regulations are not entirely technocratic in nature, but enter into the arena of policy implementation contestation in the field, especially when the state is confronted with existing settlements that have social and historical legitimacy (Basundoro, 2013; Prihandini, 2013; Yanti, et al., 2023; Atika, 2020).

Figure 1. Settlements along the Dupak Magersari railway line (Source: Doc.Personal)

The existence of this settlement shows that the space of settlements along the railway tracks cannot be interpreted solely as a matter of legality and an anomaly of formal spatial planning (conceived space), but has evolved into a social space that is produced, negotiated, and legitimised through the daily practices of its residents. Thus, this study does not merely position the Dupak Magersari settlement as a problematic informal space, but rather as an arena of discursive contestation where definitions of space, claims of legality, social legitimacy, and practices of space production compete and form new configurations that are hybrid, negotiated, and constantly shifting. Based on this, this article uses a discursive hegemony perspective to examine the extent to which the dialectic of the state's technocratic discourse in spatial governance contests the articulation of everyday space by residents, not as a final binary opposition, but as a negotiation process that opens up the possibility of a third space as an arena for reconciliation, hybridity, and intermediation of interests (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Soja, 1996, 2000). Within this framework, the production of space is understood as a continuously negotiated process, in which the boundaries between planned space and lived space become fluid, contingent, and produced

through dynamic power relations. This dynamic shapes the discursive field of contestation over the meaning of space, where state policy, institutional apparatus and citizens' spatial practices operate simultaneously as agents of space production (Harvey, 2003; Lefebvre, 1991; Soja, 1996).

Methods

This study uses a qualitative approach with an intrinsic case study design (Stake, 1995; Creswell, 2014) to examine in depth the process of producing residential space along the Dupak Magersari railway line as an arena of hegemonic contestation. This study does not view space as a neutral physical object, but rather as a discursive construction shaped by power relations, articulation of meaning, and symbolic negotiations between actors (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Lefebvre, 1991; Soja, 1996). The unit of analysis in this study is not the individual, but rather discursive practices that include narratives, policies, actions to claim space, and discourse formations that shape spatial legitimacy between the state, citizens, and local political networks.

Figure 2. Map of Residential Areas along the Dupak Magersari Railway Line
(Source: google.maps/Geographical Map)

Results

The production of residential space along the Dupak Magersari railway line cannot be interpreted solely as a matter of spatial planning inconsistency or land administration problems, but rather as an arena of discursive contestation in which the state and citizens alike produce claims of legitimacy over space. It is in this space that the technocratic discourse of state governance—supported by the logic of regulation, security, and order—meets the discourse of citizens' living space, which is constructed through practices of everyday survival, historical memories of space occupation, and moral-social claims to the right to reside. The meeting of these two regimes of meaning does not result in the absolute victory of either side, but rather forms an open, contingent, and non-final field of hegemonic negotiation (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).

Within the framework of space production, Lefebvre (1991) asserts that space is not a neutral container, but rather a product of social relations that are constantly shaped by the dialectic between spatial practice, conceived space, and lived space. This dialectic is developed by Soja (1996, 2000) as thirdspace—a third space that transcends the binary oppositions of formal-informal, legal-illegal, state-citizen, and

presents a new hybridity that is not entirely controlled by a single structure or agency. In the context of Dupak Magersari, thirdspace emerges as a space for daily negotiation, a place where the meanings of legality, informality, order, and even claims to rights to the city are redefined.

However, thirdspace does not arise automatically from the encounter of two entities, but rather through a long, complex, and tense process of discursive articulation. Referring to Laclau & Mouffe (1985), discourse is not merely a way of talking about reality, but rather a constructive action that produces reality itself through the practice of signification, the establishment of chains of equivalence, the formation of nodal points, and the production of antagonism. In other words, the struggle for space in Dupak Magersari is not only a struggle for land, but also a struggle for meaning: what is called order? What is called illegal? Who has the right to determine the function of space? And what narrative ultimately dominates public understanding?

Therefore, analysis of this phenomenon requires an interpretation that views the production of space not as the final consequence of policy, but as a hegemonic process negotiated through discursive practices that negate, coalesce, and adjust to one another. Hegemony here is not understood as total domination, but as a temporary process of articulation that is always vulnerable, fluid, and can be refuted by counter-hegemony. This is where the third space finds its ontological basis: not as a space of harmony, but as a space of contestation that continues to create possibilities for reconfiguring meaning and power relations.

Discourse Articulation in Residential Space Production

Articulation is understood as a practice that connects various social elements to form a certain discourse totality that appears stable, even though it is essentially contingent (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Articulation is not merely in the form of speech, but also policies, institutional procedures, symbolic markings, material practices, and social relations that work to uphold certain meanings as the "dominant truth". In this context, there are two main articulatory formations that compete for hegemonic position in defining space: the technocratic articulation of the state and the articulation of citizens' everyday space.

The state, through regulatory instruments, bureaucratic apparatus, and sectoral institutions, constructs the railway boundaries as a space of risk, a forbidden zone, and an object of spatial technocracy. This articulation operates through formal regulations such as the mandate for railway sterilisation in Law No. 23/2007 on Railways, the spatial planning framework in Law No. 26/2007, and the discourse on railway operational safety (Ministry of Transportation, 2007; Government of Indonesia, 2007). The underlying logic is a regime of order: space must be measurable, controllable, clean, and regulated for the sake of infrastructure efficiency and accident risk mitigation. This provision not only regulates technical safety aspects but also provides a legal basis for enforcing land management authority along the railway corridor, thereby practically consolidating the position of PT Kereta Api Indonesia (KAI) as the authority responsible for securing and managing these boundaries.

The discourse on the implementation of regulations is as stated in the statement by the Executive Vice President of PT. KAI Daops VIII Surabaya, M. Maula Nurcholis, who stated that the houses in Dupak Magersari were built on land

adjacent to the railway, only about 1.5 metres from the centre line of the track, which is in violation of Law No. 23 of 2007 (minimum 6 metres). The presence of buildings on both sides of the railway tracks is considered to disrupt and endanger train operations and must be immediately addressed (CNN Indonesia, 2012; Tempo.co, 2013). However, this legal-normative discourse clashes with the spatial practices of residents, which are based on collective memory, spatial solidarity, and the identity of the village as a living area that has been inhabited for generations (Halbwachs, 1992; Prihandini, 2013; Castells, 1983). Instead of disappearing, these settlements have consolidated themselves as spatial communities, defined as *Kampung Warga Pinggir Rel* (Railway Residents' Village)—an identity that is not only territorial, but also symbolic and political (Castells, 1983;Prihandini, 2013; Radar Surabaya, 2018). The residents' statement that "we have been here for a long time" not only indicates the duration of time, but also signifies the transformation of space as a collective identity into symbolic legitimacy of socio-historical values and the right to continue living in that space (Kompas.com, 2013; CNN Indonesia, 2013). In spatial practice, residents articulate space through the logic of everyday urbanism, whereby space is not seen as a technical issue, but as a space that is lived through daily social activities such as working, worshipping at the mosque, children playing and going to school, and trading.

Equivalence Chains in the Formation of Spatial Discourse Blocks

In the perspective of Laclau & Mouffe (2001), hegemony is not merely material domination, but rather a discursive construction that shapes social reality through the contestation of meaning. This is where hegemony works when discourse succeeds in linking many different signs into a single chain of meaning that appears to be uniform and coherent. Hegemonisation does not occur through a single, stand-alone claim, but rather through the formation of a chain of equivalence—that is, the process of connecting various demands, issues, and different markers into a single collective formation of meaning that appears to reinforce each other. In Dupak Magersari, the contest for the meaning of space does not operate as a binary conflict between the state and citizens, but as a struggle to build a hegemonic bloc through the connection of symbols, practices, and layers of legitimacy. This means that the battle for space over the land bordering the Dupak Magersari railway cannot be read solely as a single conflict or limited to normative aspects, but as a battle of discourse to define what is considered "right", "legal", "risky", "appropriate" and "valid" in the use of space. Through a chain of equivalences, each party not only argues about land, but also constructs practices of articulation that make their claims appear most reasonable and authoritative.

PT KAI and state regulatory authorities formed a chain of equivalence based on legal-technocratic logic that linked issues of safety, law, and operational functions as legal-administrative arguments that border areas should not be residential areas. Through discursive practices (the 2012 crackdown, restrictions on infrastructure development permits, confirmation of asset status), this chain functions to produce representations of space that are exclusive, normative, and control-based (Lefebvre, 1991). However, this chain is never completely stable. When claims of safety and sterilisation encounter a social reality that continues to live and evolve, the discourse of absolute legality experiences dislocation, opening a gap for counter-articulation through markers based on sustainability.

Figure 3. of the Citizen Equivalence Chain

The chain of equivalence for citizens is not a claim of ownership, but rather a claim of social entitlement. This is where we see an articulative shift—from land status to life status. Thus, spatial conflicts are not won in the formal legal arena, but in the arena of social legitimacy and collective recognition. Meanwhile, the Surabaya City Government has constructed a more political chain of equivalence by intervening in social services and infrastructure through personal rather than institutional channels, reinforced by support from the City Council. This strategy does not eliminate conflict, but postpones it through hegemonic compromise as a technique for stabilising discourse so that space can continue to be managed, rather than eliminated. As stated in an interview with a member of the DPRD who was actively involved in the intervention to install PDAM Surya Sembada master meters in 2018 and the presence of the Deputy Mayor of Surabaya in the repair of a damaged bridge in 2025 (MemoRandum Disway., 2025a, 3 February; Pers Indonesia., 2025, 10 February).

The presence of the Kapirel Learning Centre programme, initiated in March 2022 by Oktaviana Alfazriyah, Athiu Izzatillah T., Rizky Amalia, Maulida Amasari, and Evi Indra Sari together with the Dreamdelion Foundation and Career Class, strengthens the dialectic of discursive practice based on the community that forms new markers (secondary nodal signifiers) for the railway buffer zone (Kumparan, 2022). Furthermore, this settlement phenomenon was raised in an international academic forum through the 13th Pre-Event International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS), with the support of the NGOs Arkom Jatim, EUTENIKA, and SEANNET (UNAIR, 2024). This momentum is strategically significant because it shifts the issue of railway boundaries from the local administrative scale to the global academic discourse by converting residents' experiences into legitimised knowledge, which makes marginal villages the subject of discourse on the city of the future, rather than the object of planning. The logic of equivalence connects local issues with universal markers such as inclusivity, spatial justice, urban citizenship, and the right to the city, so that residents' claims to space gain wider resonance beyond formal legality. The role of the NGO Arkom Jawa Timur reinforces this discursive

dimension. More than just a technical partner, Arkom acts as an agent of counter-discourse with UIN Sunan Ampel (UINSA) through the solar-powered Public Street Lighting (PJU) programme, demonstrating how infrastructure is produced not merely as a physical installation, but as a symbol of residents' self-governing capacity. Lighting not only illuminates the village, but also illuminates the political agency of the residents themselves (UINSA, 2024; Miroslove et al., 2024).

The landscape of spatial planning power has become an arena for discourse contestation between the city government, PT KAI, residents and other actors, revealing a plural configuration of power relations (Hudalah et al., 2012; Fitriani & Haryoko, 2020). This condition creates two intersecting consequences, namely an increase in residents' bargaining power in delaying the execution of control policies, and the emergence of informal negotiation loopholes through patronage, selective legalisation, or informal governance (Chatterje, 2014; Tustiwi & Hudalah, 2018; DetikJatim, 2023). Villages on the edge of railway tracks, such as Dupak Magersari, have survived not only as a demographic fact but also as a socio-political construct produced through spatial attachment, solidarity, resistance, and the capability to construct a discourse that influences the discursive hegemony of contemporary urban politics (Laclau & Mouffe; Lefebvre, 1991; Setiawan, 2010; Prihandini, 2013; Pardede, 2020).

Thirdspace Production

The chain of equivalence formed between residents, local political actors, and community networks shows that this discursive battle never resulted in a total victory for either side. but rather forms an arena of negotiation that Soja (1996) refers to as Thirdspace, a space that is neither entirely formal nor informal, neither entirely legal nor illegal, neither a space of pure resistance nor one of total subordination. The conflicting meanings of space are condensed into a dominant narrative that appears natural, logical, and legitimate. This is where hegemony works, not as an absolute victory for one party, but as a process of organising meaning so that one articulation appears more reasonable, more valid, and more acceptable than other articulations (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). This space can only be understood as a product of hegemonic negotiation that is situational, fluid, and temporal. In this Thirdspace formation, the state does not claim legal rights over the land, but it also cannot monopolise the definition of space. Residents do not obtain formal legality, but they manage to stabilise their existence through discursive legitimacy and practical compromises that take place in the field.

Figure 3. Safety Awareness Campaign in Settlements Adjacent to Railway Tracks
(Source: PT. KAI Daop 8)

The existence of this settlement demonstrates that discursive relations work to shape spatial hegemony amid a chain of competing discourses that interpret the Dupak Magersari settlement as both a material and symbolic arena for the battle over meaning and legitimacy in contemporary urban spatial politics. This phenomenon shows that the morphology of settlements cannot be read merely as the result of an absence of planning, but rather as the result of a dialectic contestation of space that brings together physical, political and cultural dimensions (Lefebvre, 1991; Soja, 1996). Railway border settlements are not passive entities, but rather representations of lived space formed by experiences of survival, strategies of spatial claims, and narratives of legitimacy that are continuously negotiated between residents and formal authorities (Simone, 2010; Roy, 2009).

Hegemony does not work in the form of coercive domination, but rather through the temporary stabilisation of the meaning of space that allows coexistence, but does not completely resolve antagonism (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). This is the condition of Thirdspace—not just a physical third space, but an epistemic and political space that refuses to be locked into binary oppositions. Thirdspace emerges when legal claims cannot completely negate social claims, and conversely, when social claims cannot replace formal mandates, resulting in a regime of coexistence that is negotiated, not won. Therefore, this phenomenon is not merely a "persistent illegal settlement," but an unfinished formation of hegemony—a space that is stable not because of the absence of conflict, but because conflict has been postponed, transformed into negotiation, and reproduced as a mode of continuity. This reality shows that contemporary spatial politics requires an interpretation that not only explains how space is formed, but also how space is discursively formed, determined not only by spatial plans and institutional power, but also by the ability of urban actors to seize, defend, and negotiate the meaning of space itself, making it not only a place to live, but also a field of production of legitimacy and rights to the city.

Conclusion

This study confirms that the existence of settlements along the Dupak Magersari railway line is not merely a consequence of the absence of planning, but rather the result of a hegemonic process that is produced, negotiated, and maintained through discursive competition over the meaning of space. Space does not appear as a passive object of policy, but as a field of contestation for legitimacy in which the state, corporations, citizens, and social networks produce claims of truth that intersect, collide, and coexist. The results of the analysis show that the state-corporate discourse defines space through the logic of legality, asset sterilisation, and operational security, while citizens construct counter-meanings through the logic of social existence, the right to life, collective memory, and the sustainability of everyday space. This tension does not lead to the elimination of either party, but rather gives rise to a temporary and negotiated stabilisation of meaning, enabling the practice of spatial sustainability without formal legalisation. This condition confirms the thesis that hegemony does not always work through direct domination, but rather through discursive compromises that are continuously reproduced in everyday life (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Within this field, local political actors, civil society, and academic networks serve to expand the chain of equivalence, shifting the image of space from a zone of risk to a space of life, solidarity, and social future. They do not replace the dominant discourse, but disrupt the process of closure, broaden the possibilities for

interpreting space, and strengthen the social legitimacy of citizens in the public arena. Thus, the production of space in Dupak Magersari is not only material in nature, but also discursive performance: through community education, advocacy, participatory infrastructure, and academic representation, space continues to be redefined as a socially legitimate locus of life, even though it is not yet legally recognised. The formation of space that emerges from these dynamics is a manifestation of Thirdspace (Soja, 1996)—a hybrid space that refuses to be locked into oppositions such as legal/illegal, formal/informal, or resistance/subordination. Thirdspace here is not a final resolution, but rather a mode of sustainability amid tension: sustaining life not by erasing conflict, but by postponing antagonism through repeated negotiation, creating a space that is "stable enough to inhabit, but never definitively settled". Contemporary urban spatial politics are not primarily determined by formal ownership or legal instruments, but rather by who is able to organise meaning, expand discursive resonance, and maintain social legitimacy amid overlapping powers. Dupak Magersari shows that the future of urban space is not only formulated through state spatial planning, but also through the capacity of citizens and social networks to produce moral, social, and discursive justifications for their existence.

Suggestion

This study suggests that the management of residential areas along the Dupak Magersari railway line should not be approached solely through control or eviction measures. The persistence of these settlements shows that space is formed through daily practices, social ties, and long-term occupation that cannot be ignored in policy decisions. Authorities need to recognize the lived realities of residents when addressing railway boundary areas. A more dialogical and adaptive approach is needed so that spatial management can reduce conflict while maintaining public safety. Such an approach allows urban space to be governed not only through regulation, but also through social understanding and negotiated coexistence.

References

Archer, D. (2012). *Baan Mankong: Participatory slum upgrading in Bangkok, Thailand*. Asian Coalition for Housing Rights.

Arputham, J. (2010). Recent developments in plans for Dharavi and for the airport slums in Mumbai. *Environment and Urbanization, 22*(2), 501–504. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247810382273

Atika, F. A. (2020). Housing Quality pada Permukiman Informal Sempadan Rel Kereta Api, Dupak Magersari, Surabaya. *E-Journal Institut Teknologi Adhitama Surabaya*, 411–418. Retrieved fromhttp://ejurnal.itats.ac.id/sntekpan/article/download/1266/1029#:~:text = permukiman informal adalah lingkungan atau,liar' dan "kumuh".

Basundoro, P. (2013). *Dua Kota Tiga Zaman: Surabaya dan Malang sejak kolonial sampai kemerdekaan*. Ombak.

Bayat, A. (2000). *From 'dangerous classes' to 'quiet rebels': Politics of the urban subaltern in the Global South*. International Sociology, 15(3), 533–557.

Caldeira, T. P. R. (2000). *City of walls: Crime, segregation, and citizenship in São Paulo*. University of California Press.https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520221437/city-of-walls

Castells, M. (1983). *The city and the grassroots: A cross-cultural theory of urban social movements*. University of California Press.

Chatterjee, P. (2004). *The politics of the governed: Reflections on popular politics in*

most of the world. Columbia University Press.

CNN Indonesia. (2012, Maret 10). *PT KAI tertibkan bangunan di sempadan rel Surabaya.* https://www.cnnindonesia.com/

Davis, M. (2006). *Planet of slums.* Verso. https://www.versobooks.com/products/156-planet-of-slums

de Soto, H. (2000). *The mystery of capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else.* Basic Books. https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/hernando-de-soto/the-mystery-of capital/9780465016150/

Davis, M. (2006). *Planet of Slums.* Verso.

Firman, T. (2009). The continuity and change in mega-urbanization in Indonesia: A survey of Jakarta–Bandung Region (JBR) development. *Habitat International, 33*(4), 327-339. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2008.08.005

Ghertner, D. A. (2011). "Gentrifying the state, gentrifying participation: Elite governance programs in Delhi." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 35*(3), 504-532. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2011.01050.

Gilbert, A., & Gugler, J. (2002). *Cities, Poverty and Development: Urbanization in the Third World.* Oxford University Press.

Government of the Republic of Indonesia. (2007). *Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 23 Tahun 2007 tentang Perkeretaapian* [Law]. Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia. https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Download/29487/UU%20Nomor%2023%20Tah un%2020 07.pdf

Harvey, D. (2003). *The Right to the City.* International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 27(4), 939–941

Huchzermeyer, M. (2011). *Cities with 'slums': From informal settlement eradication to a right to the city in Africa.* UCT Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1xx9m9

Hudalah, D., & Firman, T. (2012). Beyond property: Industrial estates and post-suburban transformation in Jakarta Metropolitan Region. *Cities, 29*(1), 40-48. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2011.07.003

Holston, J. (2008). *Insurgent citizenship: Disjunctions of democracy and modernity in Brazil.* Princeton University Press

Kompas.com. (2013, Oktober 4). *Warga Dupak Magersari menolak penggusuran oleh PT KAI.* https://www.kompas.com/

Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (2001). *Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics* (2nd ed.). Verso. https://www.versobooks.com/products/266-hegemony-and-socialist-strategy

Leaf, M. (1994). Urban planning and urban reality under Chinese economic reforms. *Journal of Planning Education and Research, 14*(1), 49–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/0739456X9401400107

Lefebvre, H. (1991). *The production of space.* Blackwell. https://www.wiley.com/en-us/The+Production+of+Space-p-9780631181774

Marfai, M. A., Hizbaron, D. R., Firman, T., & Fatchurohman, H. (2018). Urban hazard and community resilience in Indonesia. *Environment and Urbanization Asia, 9*(1), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1177/0975425318763613

McFarlane, C. (2011). *Learning the city: Knowledge and translocal assemblage.* Wiley-Blackwell. https://www.wiley.com/enus/Learning+the+City%3A+Knowledge+and+Tr anslocal+Assemblage-p-9781405189825

MemoRandum Disway. (2025, Februari 3). *Jembatan Dupak Magersari ambles memakan dua korban, Ketua RW akan mengadu ke Wawali dan DPRD.*

https://memorandum.disway.id/metropolitan/read/124119/jembatan-dupak-magersari-ambles-memakan-dua-korban-ketua-rw-akan-mengadu-ke-wawali-dan-dprd

Meth, P. (2010). *Unsettling insurgency? Reflections on women's insubordination in South Africa*. Planning Theory & Practice, 11(2), 241–263.

Miroslove, Erina, D. T., Umamah, R., & Falasifah, N. (2024). *Perencanaan partisipatif bersama warga Dupak Magersari Surabaya: Penerangan jalan umum (PJU) solar panel menjadi aksi warga dalam mewujudkan kampung marginal ramah iklim*. UIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya. https://uinsa.ac.id/perencanaan-partisipatif-bersama-warga-dupak-magersari-surabaya-penerangan-jalan-umum-pju-solar-panel-menjadi-aksi-warga-dalam-mewujudkan-kampung-marginal-ramah-iklim

Neuwirth, R. (2005). *Shadow Cities: A Billion Squatters, A New Urban World*. Routledge.

Parnell, S., & Robinson, J. (2012). *(Re)theorizing cities from the Global South: Looking beyond neoliberalism. Urban Geography, 33*(4), 593-617. https://doi.org/10.2747/0272-3638.33.4.593

Perlman, J. E. (1976). *The myth of marginality: Urban poverty and politics in Rio de Janeiro*. University of California Press. https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520033726/the-myth-of-marginality

Perlman, J. E. (2010). *Favela: Four decades of living on the edge in Rio de Janeiro*. Oxford University Press. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/favela-9780195368363 https://archive.org/details/favelafourdecade0000perl

Pers Indonesia. (2025, Februari 10). *Kepastian perbaikan jembatan Dupak Magersari: Warga akhirnya bernafas lega*. https://persindonesia.com/2025/02/10/kepastian-perbaikan-jembatan-dupak-magersari-warga-akhirnya-bernafas-lega

Prihandini, N. (2013). *Gerakan kelompok marginal Dupak Magersari Surabaya terhadap penertiban bangunan pinggir rel oleh PT. KAI: Studi kasus komunitas warga pinggir rel*. Media Jurnal Politik Muda, 2(3). Repository Universitas Airlangga. https://repository.unair.ac.id/16511

Radar Surabaya. (2018, Juni 12). *Aliansi KWPR tolak penggusuran sempadan rel*. https://radarsurabaya.jawapos.com/

Rolnik, R. (2013). "Ten years of the City Statute in Brazil: From the struggle for urban reform to the World Cup cities." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 37*(5), 1650-1658. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12054

Roy, A. (2005). Urban informality: Toward an epistemology of planning. *Journal of the American Planning Association, 71*(2), 147–158. https://doi.org/10.1080/01944360508976689

Roy, A. (2009). Why India cannot plan its cities: Informality, insurgence and the idiom of planning. *Planning Theory, 8*(1), 76–87. https://doi.org/10.1177/1473095208099299

Setiawan, B. (2010). Kampung kota and kota kampung: Challenges of Indonesian urban development. *Jurnal Perencanaan Wilayah dan Kota, 21*(1), 65–81. https://journals.itb.ac.id/index.php/jpwk/article/view/4209

Shatkin, G. (2004). Planning to forget: Informal settlements as "forgotten" places in globalizing Metro Manila. *Urban Studies, 41*(12), 2469–2484. https://doi.org/10.1080/00420980412331297622

Silas, J. (1992). Urban kampung improvement and housing policy in Surabaya. *Habitat International, 16*(4), 141–151. https://doi.org/10.1016/0197-3975(92)90043-N

Soja, E. W. (1996). *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and other real-and-imagined places*. Blackwell.
https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Thirdspace-p-9780631193388

Simone, A. M. (2004). *For the city yet to come: Changing African life in four cities*. Duke University Press.
https://www.dukeupress.edu/for-the-city-yet-to-come

Universitas Airlangga. (2024, Juli 27). *Pre-event ICAS 13 angkat tema kehidupan di dua kampung Surabaya*. https://unair.ac.id/pre-event-icas-13-angkat-tema-kehidupan-di-dua-kampung-surabaya/

Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Ampel Surabaya. (2024, Juni 5). *Perencanaan partisipatif bersama warga Dupak Magersari Surabaya: Penerangan jalan umum (PJU) solar panel menjadi aksi warga dalam mewujudkan kampung marginal ramah iklim*. https://uinsa.ac.id/perencanaan-partisipatif-bersama-warga-dupak-magersari-surabaya-penerangan-jalan-umum-pju-solar-panel-menjadi-aksi-warga-dalam-mewujudkan-kampung-marginal-ramah-iklim

UN-Habitat. (2016). *World Cities Report 2016: Urbanization and Development*. United Nations Human Settlements Programme.

Yanti, F., dkk. (2023). *Penilaian tingkat kekumuhan permukiman sempadan rel di Surabaya berdasarkan indikator KemenPUPR No. 14 Tahun 2018. Jurnal Tata Kota dan Daerah*, 15(2), 89–103.
Yin, R. K. (2018). *Case study research and applications: Design and methods* (6th ed.). Sage Publications.

Yiftachel, O. (2009). Critical theory and 'gray space': Mobilization of the colonized. *City, 13*(2–3), 246–263.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13604810902982227