

Original Article

Handling of Collective Violence by the Indonesian National Police (Case Study on the Handling of Conflicts Between Mass Organizations in Denpasar City)

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Abstract:

Social conflicts between mass organizations (*Ormas*) in Bali, particularly in Denpasar, frequently triggered collective violence between 2010 and 2017. Following interventions by the Denpasar Resort Police (Polresta Denpasar) starting in 2017, these incidents ceased, making the police's efforts the focus of this research. This study examines collective violence between *Ormas* in Denpasar, the efforts of the Denpasar Resort Police in handling it, and the factors influencing the effectiveness of this conflict management. The research, conducted using a qualitative approach, revealed several findings, including that the root causes of collective violence were the militant attitudes of *Ormas* members and disputes over land. Handling that was not focused, tending to occur only at the time of the violent incidents, along with weak law enforcement, caused collective violence between *Ormas* to recur repeatedly. The existence of *Ormas* in Bali, exploited by political actors to gain votes or support, made it difficult for the police to break the cycle of violence. Comprehensive handling by the Denpasar Resort Police through criminal law enforcement efforts, non-penal measures, and the use of media succeeded in suppressing acts of collective violence by *Ormas*. The success of the handling by the Denpasar Resort Police cannot be separated from the leadership factors of the Bali Regional Police Chief, intervention in *Ormas* through government policies, the use of media, and community support. All these factors strengthened the handling efforts carried out by the Denpasar Resort Police.

Keywords: Social Conflict, Collective Violence, Handling.

Introduction

The occurrence of collective violence in social conflicts has a significant impact on security stability. The Chief of the Indonesian National Police during General Tito

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Karnavian's tenure emphasized the importance of preventive measures for his personnel to prevent social conflicts that have the potential to cause riots, because their impacts are more fatal than conventional crimes ([Liputan6.com, 2018](#)). Social conflict, according to Lewis Coser, is a dispute over values, status, power, or resources, in which parties compete not only to gain interests but also to harm opponents ([Oberschall, 1978](#)). Conflict emerges when a critical point of competition is reached due to prolonged rivalry ([Queen et al., 1959](#)).

In Bali, social conflicts between mass organizations (also known as 'Ormas') such as Laskar Bali, Baladika, and Pemuda Padang Sambian have resulted in collective violence in the form of beatings, arson, stabbings, and murders, particularly in Denpasar City, throughout the 2010-2017 period ([kompas.com; Liputan6.com; Detik.com; Okezone.com; Merdeka.com; MetroBali.com; Bali Tribun News, 2010-2017](#)). This collective violence can be either organized or spontaneous ([R. R. Nitibaskara, 2018](#)), and according to Colombijn ([2005](#)) falls into the category of violence by strongmen or militias, distinct from state violence, communal violence, or temporary individual violence. Prolonged conflict results in the paralysis of community activities and disrupts the sense of security, while delayed handling by authorities can expand the chaos ([Elliott & Merrill, 1961; T. R. R. Nitibaskara, 2001; Parsons, 1949; Simanjuntak, 2009](#)).

Several previous studies, such as that by [McDonald & Wilson \(2017\)](#), examined competition among local militia groups in Bali vying for areas of security responsibility. The results of their research indicated that competition between *Ormas* groups was often exploited by political interests, thereby triggering unhealthy rivalry and clashes with state apparatus. However, this study did not focus on the continuation of conflict leading to collective violence and riots, so the impact on security stability has not been explored in depth.

The handling of collective violence by the Bali Regional Police (Polda Bali) since 2017 has shown positive results. Various strategic measures by the Regional Police Chief, Inspector General Pol Petrus Golose, and his staff, including mediation between *Ormas* leaders and strict monitoring of potential conflicts, succeeded in suppressing clashes to zero in the 2017-2019 period ([Udayana, 2018; rri.com, 2019](#)). This change provided a sense of security to the community and created more stable peace.

Based on the description above, this study aims to analyze the causal factors behind the recurrence of collective violence between *Ormas* in Bali during the 2010–2017 period, the forms of handling applied by Polda Bali and the Denpasar Resort Police (Polresta Denpasar), and the effectiveness of police measures in preventing the recurrence of such violence. This research fills a gap in previous literature by focusing on conflicts between *Ormas* that escalate into collective violence, as well as their implications for public security, thereby contributing both to policing theory and the practice of social conflict management in Bali.

Methods

This study employs a qualitative approach using a case study method supplemented by a survey, aiming to explore in depth the handling of collective violence between mass organizations (*Ormas*) by the Bali Regional Police (Polda Bali) and the Denpasar Resort Police (Polresta Denpasar). The case study was chosen because the incidents of collective violence in Bali are unique and occur within a specific context, particularly in Denpasar City, thus allowing them to represent the pattern of police handling in the Bali region. The research focus includes the efforts of the Denpasar

Resort Police in handling collective violence and the implementation of strategic policies by the Bali Regional Police, specifically during the 2010-2019 period.

Data collection was carried out using three main techniques. First, in-depth interviews were conducted with key informants who possess the capacity and competence to understand the phenomenon of collective violence, including the Denpasar Resort Police Chief, Senior Officials of the Resort Police, Sector Police Chiefs, community leaders, youth leaders, religious figures, local community members, Senior Officials of the Bali Regional Police, and the Head of the National Unity and Community Protection Agency (Badan Kesbang Linmas) of Bali Province. Informants were selected using purposive sampling, based on considerations of experience, position, and mastery of the issues under study. Second, document research was conducted to obtain secondary data from books, archives, police reports, official letters, policy documents, and publications related to the activities of mass organizations and their handling by the police. Third, a descriptive survey was carried out through questionnaires distributed to 200 police members from the Denpasar Resort Police and Bali Regional Police, as well as 150 residents of Denpasar City who were randomly selected from areas affected by collective violence. This survey aimed to assess respondents' views on the police's handling efforts and the security situation related to the presence of mass organizations.

Data analysis in this qualitative research followed three main stages according to [Miles & Huberman \(1984\)](#), namely data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing. Data from interviews and documents were selected and filtered to emphasize relevant information (reduction), then presented in the form of narrative text to be easily understood and analyzed (display), before drawing conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the police's handling and policies (conclusion drawing). Meanwhile, survey data were processed using descriptive statistical analysis through SPSS to describe the frequency, perceptions, and assessments of respondents systematically, factually, and accurately. By combining these methods, the research can provide a comprehensive overview of the efforts to handle collective violence by the Bali police, as well as public perceptions of the effectiveness of the policies implemented.

Results

Analysis of the Development and Dynamics of Collective Violence by Mass Organizations (*Ormas*) in Denpasar City

The development of mass organizations (*Ormas*) in the post-Reformation era in Indonesia increased significantly alongside the advancement of human rights appreciation and democracy which guarantee the freedom of association, assembly, and expression of opinion as guaranteed in the 1945 Constitution. Yet, the old regulation concerning *Ormas*, namely Law No. 8 of 1985, was considered no longer suitable for the dynamics of modern society. Law No. 17 of 2013 replaced the old law, providing ease in establishing an *Ormas* with only 3 citizens, and a minimum leadership structure of 1 chairperson, 1 secretary, and 1 treasurer. This law also grants authority to the central government and regional governments to conduct supervision and impose sanctions, although the lengthy and complex sanction system provides loopholes for *Ormas* that commit legal violations (Law No. 17/2013).

In Bali, the existence of *Ormas* such as Laskar Bali, Baladika, and Pemuda Bali Bersatu exploited these legal loopholes, resulting in collective clashes that often caused casualties, material damage, and public fear. These clashes were generally triggered by

two main factors: member militancy towards their group and disputes over territory or land. The militant attitude was clearly evident in the clashes on Jalan Nangka (2010) due to revenge acts, in Padang Sambian (2012) due to disputes over security territory, and in front of Dharma Yadnya Hospital (2013) due to offenses between *Ormas* members. Land disputes triggered the clashes on Jalan Cargo (2013), while the largest clash occurred on Jalan Teuku Umar (2015) which killed 4 people as a domino effect of a commotion at Kerobokan Prison. Violence was carried out using sharp weapons, sweeping, destruction, and arson, causing social trauma and material losses (Meliala, 2001; R. R. Nitibaskara, 2018; T. R. R. Nitibaskara, 2001).

Theoretically, conflicts between *Ormas* in Denpasar can be analyzed through Lewis Coser's conflict theory, where disputes occur concerning status, power, and wealth resources, and the disputing parties not only seek group advantages but also attempt to harm opponents (Coser, 1964; Oberschall, 1978). Tensions are often worsened by the practice of thuggery and illegal levies in areas claimed by *Ormas*, which provide economic incentives for members, particularly the unemployed or individuals with minimal skills (Crime Causation: Economic Theories, law.jrank.org). This economic factor is reinforced by the opportunity for illegal profits that are relatively easier to obtain compared to legal work, as well as the minimal risk of law enforcement.

In addition to economic factors, symbolic benefits or pride also motivate aggressive actions. New members imitate the violence styles and methods of senior members to gain recognition, power, and income. Bandura (1997) social learning theory explains that aggression is imitated if the perpetrator sees others gaining benefits from violent acts. Thus, aggressive behavior becomes internalized within the *Ormas* community.

Collective violence is also driven by group emotionality and irrationality, in line with Bon (1896) view which emphasizes that mass behavior is influenced by imitation, irrationality, and emotionality. The militant attitude of *Ormas* members reinforces the repetition of violent acts even though previous traumatic experiences have been endured (Meliala, 2001; R. R. Nitibaskara, 2018). Littman & Paluck (2015) add that group identification and deliberate strategies remove individuals' psychological barriers to violence, making group intervention crucial to break the cycle of violence.

The handling efforts by the Bali police, particularly the Denpasar Resort Police (Polresta Denpasar), include summoning *Ormas* leaders, preventive patrols, and policy recommendations to the Governor of Bali to review the existence of *Ormas*. This policy intervention aims to reduce emotionality, decrease group aggression, and enforce public order. Such intervention is considered important because individual actions are insufficient to stop the cycle of collective violence that has become internalized within the *Ormas* community (Littman & Paluck, 2015; R. R. Nitibaskara, 2018).

Thus, the dynamics of collective violence by *Ormas* in Denpasar represent a combination of structural factors (*Ormas* Law), economic factors (illegal levies and thuggery), social factors (group identification and pride), and psychological factors (emotionality and irrationality), which require integrated legal and policy interventions so that public security and order can be maintained.

Analysis of Factors Causing the Recurrence of Collective Violence in the 2010-2017 Period

Allowing the existence of mass organizations (*Ormas*) that frequently engage in thuggery and disturb the community, without action from the police, will not break the

cycle of violence. Several factors underlie why *Ormas* continued to exist in Bali, even though according to the data presented in the findings section, they had committed many unlawful acts and disturbed the community. These factors include weak law enforcement, the presence of conflicts of interest, and deliberate maintenance or exploitation by political elites seeking votes in the community. These factors are also what caused collective violence between *Ormas* to recur repeatedly during the 2010-2017 period. For the police, the factor of weak law enforcement must be the primary concern before undertaking other efforts in handling collective violence. The absence of firm law enforcement from the police, as the institution with authority in law enforcement, can convince *Ormas* members that the violence and thuggery committed by *Ormas* against the community are not a significant problem for the police. Their increasingly prominent existence and the tolerance shown by the police led many community members to join *Ormas* groups. According to Bandura's social learning theory, observing violent acts that receive rewards or positive reinforcement can instill the belief that violence and aggression are acceptable actions ([Hall & Lindzey, 1998](#)).

The weak application of law by the Bali police during the 2010-2017 period, based on research findings, was caused by conflicts of interest. A conflict of interest is a situation where a state official who gains power and authority based on laws and regulations has or is suspected of having a personal interest in every use of that authority, which can affect the quality and performance that should be delivered ([aclc.kpk.go.id](#)). The Bali Regional Police and its ranks, in carrying out their duties to maintain public security and order, have a number of authorities as contained in Article 15 of Law Number 2 of 2002 concerning the Indonesian National Police. One of these authorities is to carry out the legal process, from summoning witnesses for investigation purposes to submitting case files to the public prosecutor for criminal acts occurring in the community.

Conflicts of interest among police officers can occur because they share the same ethnicity, are relatives of the perpetrators, or for other reasons, such as having received facilities from *Ormas*, which can certainly create reluctance to enforce the law professionally. The finding of conflicts of interest in law enforcement certainly caused the quality of handling by the police in addressing collective violence by *Ormas* to be suboptimal. It is no wonder that they then felt above the law and increased their arrogance in the midst of society. The unprofessionalism of law enforcement in handling collective violence between *Ormas* in Bali is one of the factors causing the ineffectiveness of law enforcement efforts in resolving social problems in society ([Soekanto, 2008](#)).

J.E. Sahetapy, in his writing entitled "The Rise of Mass Violence: A Mirror of Distrust in the Law," published in the KHN Newsletter, May 2003 edition, p. 14, also conveyed a similar point regarding the tolerance of crime. According to him, the various forms of violence that have occurred so far seem to have been considered ordinary by some parts of society, so that violence is often used as a tool by individuals or groups for certain reasons and purposes, setting aside the law which should be the guiding principle.

Another factor causing the recurrence of collective violence was unfocused handling. Police handling during the 2010-2017 period was considered by many sources to only solve problems on the surface. Like a fire department, police handling was carried out only when collective violence or clashes between *Ormas* occurred. Mediation was one of the most common methods used in handling collective violence between *Ormas* in Bali. This can be seen in the handling of collective violence between *Ormas*

that occurred in 2015 in Denpasar. Polda Bali took over the handling. Both *Ormas* leaders were summoned to be brought together and reconciled directly by the Bali Regional Police Chief. This type of handling turned out to be insufficient to stop or guarantee that the feuding *Ormas* would not repeat violent acts, especially among *Ormas* members who were still militant towards their groups and still held grudges against each other. The continued existence of *Ormas* meant that the potential for *Ormas* members to become involved again in collective violence was maintained. The existence of these groups plays a major role in influencing their members to commit violent acts again. According to [Littman & Paluck \(2015\)](#), their research findings state that the existence of groups identified with violence can encourage their members to engage in violent behavior through group identification and deliberate strategies, and by removing psychological barriers to violence (i.e., by removing members' reluctance to be hostile).

The third factor influencing why collective violence recurred during the 2010-2017 period was the maintenance or exploitation of *Ormas* by political elites to gain votes and support in the community. Research findings indicate a link between *Ormas* in Bali and politics. Political elites have an interest in *Ormas* because they are often used as vote banks in election contests. Many regional heads and council members succeeded in securing their positions thanks to vote support from *Ormas* members, especially Laskar Bali, Baladika, and Pemuda Bali Bersatu. This conflict of interest became one of the reasons why officials and political elites could not be firm with them. The support from political elites and officials also made them more arrogant and daring towards the authorities because there were parties who would defend and help them if they were taken through legal proceedings.

One of the sources, who previously served in the Criminal Investigation Unit of the Badung Police, stated that during the heyday of the *Ormas*, the position of the police in Bali seemed to be beneath them. The police, who should have had legal authority, were unable to do much due to conflicts of interest, both at the leadership and member levels. Another source serving in the Operations Division of the Denpasar Resort Police also mentioned that internal intervention in the investigation process diminished the investigators' motivation to complete cases involving *Ormas*. Soerjono Soekanto stated that the poor personality of law enforcers and their failure to set a good example in legal compliance will make the law ineffective in deterring perpetrators ([Arief, 1992](#)). It was this weakness in law enforcement caused by conflicts of interest that made action against perpetrators of violence by *Ormas* members suboptimal, thus failing to provide a deterrent effect to the perpetrators. *Ormas* members would eventually feel above the law and have the potential to repeat their unlawful acts, including involvement in acts of collective violence.

[Analysis of Efforts to Handle Collective Violence Between Mass Organizations \(*Ormas*\)](#)

The efforts to handle collective violence carried out by the Bali Regional Police (Polda Bali), particularly the Denpasar Resort Police (Polresta Denpasar), focused on how to stop the spread of collective violence between *Ormas* and how to prevent its recurrence. Conflicts or tensions between *Ormas* that have manifested in the form of collective violent acts are social problems that need to be addressed by the police. The frequent incidents of collective violence in Denpasar City can already be classified as social problems because, according to the views of community leaders, the police, local government, and media reports, they have disrupted the order and security of Bali. These

recurring incidents have disturbed the community, thus requiring handling by relevant agencies, one of which is the police. An event or incident can be categorized as a social problem when there is a situation declared by a number of people who have authority, who then agree that action is needed to solve the problem (Soetomo, 1995). The handling efforts by the police in addressing social problems are a subject of study for researchers to develop police science (Suparlan, 1998). The question is whether the handling efforts carried out by the Denpasar Resort Police have been able to prevent the recurrence of collective violence between *Ormas* in Denpasar City.

In carrying out efforts to handle acts of collective violence between *Ormas* that were prevalent in Denpasar City, the Denpasar Resort Police was guided by the policies of the Bali Regional Police Chief. The policy of Inspector General Petrus Golose during his tenure as Bali Regional Police Chief was to take firm action against all kinds of violent acts committed by *Ormas*. The firm action meant here is to carry out the legal process professionally without compromise. There would be no more peace agreements in handling various violent acts involving *Ormas*. All cases involving *Ormas* were processed to completion, no compromises. Police Chiefs and Sector Police Chiefs in the ranks who were caught playing games in handling violence cases involving *Ormas* were threatened with removal from their positions. According to the Head of Operations of the Denpasar Resort Police, the Regional Police Chief would not even hesitate to order his members to take firm measured action (shooting) if there were *Ormas* perpetrators who resisted during forced efforts. Members who dared to shoot these *Ormas* perpetrators would themselves be given a reward of Rp 100,000,000 rupiah. According to the researcher, this firmness from the Regional Police Chief was a form of conveying a message to *Ormas* members that the current Regional Police Chief was not joking in taking action against *Ormas* members who committed violent acts and crimes. Internally, this also served as a whip for his ranks to start introspecting and begin daring to take firm action against *Ormas* that committed various violent acts and crimes in their areas. Improving the weaknesses in law enforcement that, during the previous period, had been one of the factors in the recurrence of collective violence became the focus of Regional Police Chief Inspector General Petrus Golose in every one of his policies.

The Denpasar Resort Police, whose area had the most incidents of collective violence involving *Ormas*, became the frontline bastion for the Bali Regional Police to be able to carry out handling efforts in accordance with the Bali Regional Police Chief's policies. The implementation of the policy of firm action without compromise against violent acts involving *Ormas* was reflected in the handling of the clash between the Laskar Bali and Baladika *Ormas* that occurred on January 22, 2017. In the clash incident that occurred on Jalan Nuansa Indah, Denpasar City, the Denpasar Resort Police instructed its ranks to arrest all perpetrators involved in the clash. The legal process was carried out firmly and without compromise. No party was allowed to intervene in the investigation process being carried out by the police at that time. The firmness of the Bali Regional Police Chief and the Resort Police ranks in enforcing the law became shock therapy for *Ormas* members to think twice before committing similar acts.

Ormas leaders and members became increasingly careful in their actions because the Bali Regional Police Chief truly maintained his distance from them. This effort was made to avoid conflicts of interest. The Bali Regional Police Chief did not give the slightest space to *Ormas* leaders or parties with interests in *Ormas* to intervene in the course of the legal process being carried out by his ranks. This was one application of the Bali Regional Police Chief's no-compromise attitude. This firm and no-compromise

attitude was then emphasized to his ranks to adopt a similar stance in handling violence by *Ormas* members. The Denpasar Resort Police Chief, as the extension of the Regional Police Chief in the Denpasar City area, also shared the same view as the Regional Police Chief in handling problematic *Ormas*. According to him, one of the keys in handling thugs, including thugs disguised as *Ormas*, was not to accept anything from them. This included the implementation of avoiding conflicts of interest. By not accepting any facilities or assistance from them, the police could carry out a firm law enforcement process without any burden. From this description, we can conclude that Polda Bali and its ranks, in handling collective violence between *Ormas*, carried out law enforcement efforts, which are their authority, professionally. In order for this law enforcement effort to be effective in creating an impact on society, one of the factors that was improved was the law enforcers themselves, namely the police members from the leadership level to the member level. There would be no more compromises in handling *Ormas*; all cases must be processed legally to completion. If anyone played games, there was a threat of removal for Resort Police Chiefs and Sector Police Chiefs in their ranks. The professional attitude shown by the leadership of the Bali Regional Police and its ranks became another requirement for the law to be effective in providing deterrence to perpetrators of crimes. The law enforcers at the Denpasar Resort Police must have good personalities and set an example in compliance with the law ([Arief, 1992](#)).

Police handling efforts did not stop only at the collective violence cases that occurred. Polda Bali and its ranks appeared proactive in taking various actions against acts of thuggery involving *Ormas*. As explained in the findings, the results of research conducted by a special team of the Bali Regional Police Chief explained that the problems prevalent in Bali, besides drugs, were thuggery. The findings of the Regional Police Chief's special team explained that social order in Bali was disturbed by clashes between *Ormas* and various acts of violence and thuggery committed by *Ormas* members. According to the Regional Police Chief in his book entitled *Innovation and Actualization from Bali*, thugs, most of whom were *Ormas* members, constantly exerted pressure and coercion on the community to pay fees and contributions. Tensions between mass groups have been further heightened by the rivalry for parking spots and territorial claims, which has increased the likelihood of collective violence between them. The results of the research conducted by the Regional Police Chief's special researcher on the root causes of collective violence between *Ormas* in Bali had almost similar findings to the research results conducted by [McDonald & Wilson \(2017\)](#) in their paper entitled "Trouble in Paradise: Contesting security in Bali." The results of the research published in the *Journal Security & Dialogue* indicated that the contestation among *Ormas* in Bali was caused by competition for resources. Each *Ormas* group in Bali contested with one another over claims to local security responsibility areas in Bali. This competition then increased tensions between *Ormas*. Triggers that could occur at any time could turn tension into actual conflict in the form of collective violence between *Ormas*. The results of the research conducted by researchers in the field also showed similar findings. In this case, the majority of communities' collective violence is motivated by economic factors, specifically the competition for resources or land.

Based on these research findings, handling efforts against acts of thuggery generally carried out by *Ormas* members were consistently undertaken using law enforcement efforts. Various forms of violent acts such as extortion, threats, and persecution committed by *Ormas* members were immediately acted upon and processed legally. The same action was also taken against various illegal levies that were prevalent

in Bali, especially Denpasar City. The Denpasar Resort Police Chief, in his statement during the interview session, appeared very firm in taking action against all forms of thuggery carried out by *Ormas*. Every time information was received about the existence of illegal levies or other thuggish acts, his ranks were ordered to immediately take action and process them legally. The consistency of the Denpasar Resort Police in handling thuggery was reflected in the reports on the handling of thuggery cases by Polda Bali and its ranks. The Denpasar Resort Police ranked first in taking action against thuggery cases in its area during the 2017-2019 period. The number of cases handled was far higher than other Resort Police in the Bali region.

Efforts to handle thuggery were a form of proactive police effort to reduce tensions between *Ormas*. Various acts of thuggery committed by *Ormas* members, such as acts of violence, intimidation, and threats, were a form of their arrogance in strengthening their influence in the community and against other *Ormas*. These behaviors were the main triggers for incidents of collective violence between *Ormas*. Through firm and sustained legal action against acts of thuggery committed by *Ormas* members, it was hoped that the emergence of collective violence in Denpasar City could be suppressed.

In addition to acts of thuggery, intervention and handling efforts were also directed at acts that disturbed the community, such as illegal levies and extortion against business actors in Bali. One of the main reasons for the prevalence of thuggery and arrogance committed by *Ormas* members was to show their existence in the midst of society; they planted their influence in an area to gain security claims in that area. By controlling an area, they arbitrarily imposed illegal levies on various business sectors in that area. Not only large business actors, but small traders were also not spared from illegal levies. Land grabbing has become commonplace as a result of this profit, which is quite likely to lead to larger disputes and communal violence. Efforts to take action against *Ormas* members who carried out illegal levies were carried out by the police to break the chain of violence while simultaneously reducing tension.

Handling by the Denpasar Resort Police not only targeted acts of thuggery committed by *Ormas* members. Other crimes committed by *Ormas* members, such as drugs, were also targets for action by the Denpasar Resort Police. From the data findings at the Denpasar Resort Police Narcotics Unit, there were around 14 drug cases involving *Ormas* members. These findings confirmed the statements of several sources that wherever there is thuggery, drug cases are also prevalent there. Various types of crimes involving *Ormas* members could indicate that the existence of *Ormas* in Bali was completely contrary to their vision and mission, which was to build and maintain the stability of Bali, including maintaining the harmony and welfare of the Balinese people.

Action against perpetrators of thuggery and drugs involving *Ormas* not only targeted members; *Ormas* leaders and big shots were also targets for action by the Denpasar Resort Police. During the leadership period of Regional Police Chief Inspector General Petrus Golose, the Resort Police Chief succeeded in uncovering two *Ormas* leaders or big shots involved in thuggery and drug crimes. Various crime disclosures involving *Ormas* were inseparable from the existence of a special task force formed by the Regional Police Chief called CTOC. The existence of CTOC, equipped with various technological sophistications, made it easier for Resort Police ranks to uncover cases. The Denpasar Resort Police often collaborated with this task force in uncovering cases, including uncovering *Ormas* involvement in various criminal acts.

CTOC, seen from its full name Counter Transnational Organized Crime, is essentially a task force tasked with uncovering transnational organized crimes such as

drugs and terrorism. Transnational Organized Crime is a combination of the terms organized crime and transnational (UNODC, 2002). Organized crime or an organized group according to Article 2 letter (a) of the UNTOC is a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established pursuant to this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. Meanwhile, being transnational implies that: a). The crime is committed in more than one country: b). It is committed in one country but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another country: c). It is committed in one country but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one country: or d). It is committed in one country but has substantial effects in another country.

There are 18 categories of Transnational Organized Crime according to the UN, namely “Money Laundering, Terrorist Activities, Theft of Art and Cultural Objects, Theft of Intellectual Property, Illicit Traffic in Arms, Sea Piracy, Hijacking on Land, Insurance Fraud, Computer Crime, Environmental Crime, Trafficking in Persons, Trade in Human Body Parts, Illicit Drug Trafficking, Bankruptcy Fraud, Infiltration of Legal Business, Corruption, Bribery of Public Officials, and Other Offences Committed by Organized Criminal Groups.” When these 18 TOC categories are associated with the crimes committed by *Ormas* in Bali, they actually do not yet meet the elements to be called Transnational Organized Crime. Various crimes involving *Ormas*, such as acts of thuggery and narcotics, could only be categorized as Organized Crime and operated only in the Bali region. Therefore, according to the researcher, the CTOC task force, which should have had the main task of carrying out missions on TOC crimes, in the efforts to handle collective violence involving *Ormas*, was only empowered to help handle cases that were of concern to the Bali Regional Police Chief, such as acts of thuggery and other crimes involving *Ormas*. The availability of qualified human resources and sophisticated equipment owned by the CTOC task force was utilized by Polda and its ranks to assist law enforcement efforts, which during the 2010-2017 period were considered weak. According to Soerjono Soekanto, there are 4 (four) things that must be fulfilled for the law to be effective and have a positive impact, one of which is the availability of adequate facilities to support the law enforcement process (Arief, 1992). Many crime cases involving *Ormas*, as described in the findings, were successfully uncovered by the Denpasar Resort Police thanks to support and cooperation with the CTOC task force.

In addition to law enforcement, specifically at the Denpasar Resort Police according to the statement of the Denpasar Resort Police Chief, perpetrators of thuggery and illegal levies who had been arrested were exposed in front of the media with their hands and feet in chains. The researcher agrees with the statement of the Denpasar Resort Police Chief in the findings chapter that the legal process alone is not enough to provide a deterrent effect to perpetrators who have frequently committed criminal acts. According to the Resort Police Chief, other efforts needed to be made to increase the deterrent effect on perpetrators, one of which was to expose them in the mass media.

This similarity of opinion is based on the thinking of G.P. Hoefnagels that in addition to prioritizing the application of law, another thing that can be done is to utilize the media in providing punishment to perpetrators of crimes (Nawawi Arief: 2011). This effort was made solely to strengthen the provision of a deterrent effect to the perpetrators. At certain moments, the Denpasar Resort Police also held press releases or massive exposés of the results of crime actions/disclosures at the Renon Field. Renon

Field is one of the public places favored by the people of Denpasar city and tourists. Various community activities, from sports to just recreation, are often carried out in this place. The exposé or press release activities regarding the disclosure of crimes involving *Ormas* by the Denpasar Resort Police were carried out to provide a deterrent effect to the perpetrators by displaying them in front of the public through the media. Besides providing a deterrent effect to the perpetrators, law enforcement efforts accompanied by public exposure also served as an educational tool for the community not to commit similar acts. This was one form of punishment carried out by the Denpasar Resort Police. The sanctions given to perpetrators aimed to prevent people from committing crimes. The prevention intended here was not only special deterrence aimed at the perpetrators of crimes, but also general deterrence aimed at the community. According to Roeslan Saleh, there are 3 (three) reasons regarding the necessity of applying criminal sanctions and criminal law in crime prevention (Muladi & Nawawi Arief: 2002), one of which is that the influence of criminal sanctions or criminal law is not solely directed at the criminal but also to influence people who are not criminals, namely community members who adhere to social norms. Hence, in the context of handling acts of collective violence by *Ormas*, one of the suggested ways to campaign for non-violent behavior in society is to use the media (Colombijn, 2005).

Beyond the use of media, there are other reasons underlying why law enforcement efforts alone are not sufficient in combating crime. Although superficially penal efforts are seen as a powerful weapon in combating crime, based on the views of several scholars such as Rubin, Schultz, Karl O. Christiansen, Donald R. Taft, and Ralph W. England, combating crime through penal means has limitations. Some of the limitations expressed by these experts include that punishment has little or no effect on the crime problem, the rise and fall of crime in a country is not related to changes in its law but is related to the workings or functioning of major cultural changes in society, the influence of punishment on the wider community is very difficult to measure, and finally, the effectiveness of law cannot be measured accurately.

Based on these limitations and weaknesses, crime prevention also needs to involve non-penal efforts. According to Barda Nawawi Arief, in his book entitled Anthology of Criminal Law Policy, non-penal prevention efforts (outside the law) are efforts that emphasize the preventive nature, namely actions in the form of prevention before the crime occurs. Considering that these non-penal prevention efforts are more preventive in nature, the main target of handling is the conducive factors causing crime, such as social problems that directly or indirectly cause and increase the escalation of crime. Looking at the research findings, one of the causes of tension and triggers for acts of collective violence between *Ormas* was the militant attitude of *Ormas* members towards their groups. This tension-causing factor was then intervened by the police by taking down *Ormas* billboards and attributes in all public places in Denpasar City. The basis for taking down these *Ormas* billboards and attributes had actually existed since 2015. The Governor of Bali at that time, after the major clash between *Ormas* that occurred in Denpasar City in 2015, had issued a Circular Letter addressed to all Mayors/Regents throughout Bali. The circular letter essentially requested all Mayors/Regents in Bali to carry out the control/removal of *Ormas* billboards and attributes. The Governor of Bali reasoned that the installation of these billboards was on one hand unlicensed, and on the other hand, it caused tension between *Ormas*. Massive control could only be implemented during the leadership of Bali Regional Police Chief Inspector General Petrus Golose. The full support of the Bali Regional Police Chief and his ranks enabled

the Satpol PP officers, assisted by the community, to intensively socialize and control various *Ormas* attributes and billboards. This effort was inseparable from the courage and firmness of the Bali Regional Police Chief Inspector General Petrus Golose towards his ranks to back up the implementation of control by relevant agencies.

When examined from a legal perspective, the billboard control policy that received full support from the Bali Regional Police Chief was based on several laws and regulations that could serve as a basis. First, the Circular Letter of the Governor of Bali Number 220/24605/Bid.II/BPKB dated December 23, 2015. The circular letter stated that based on the instruction of the Governor of Bali to Mayors and Regents throughout Bali to control all Billboards, Banners, and other media belonging to *Ormas* and for all *Ormas* to voluntarily remove their own billboards, but if by the specified deadline the *Ormas* billboards had not been removed, then for public security and order, dismantling could be carried out by authorized officers. Second, Denpasar Mayor Regulation Number 3 of 2014 concerning advertising arrangement. It is stated in this regulation that in order to create beauty and cleanliness from illegal billboards, billboards that do not obtain permits can be controlled by dismantling the billboards to suppress the installation of illegal or unlicensed advertisements.

When examined from these two regulations, the authority to control *Ormas* was indeed fully the authority of the local government, in this case, the Satpol PP. However, the police, based on the authority they have, have an obligation to back up control activities from attacks by irresponsible parties. These perpetrators could be subject to criminal sanctions by the police using the persecution article (Article 351 of the Criminal Code), the beating article (Article 170 of the Criminal Code), the threat article (Article 335 of the Criminal Code), and the article on resisting government officials carrying out state duties (Article 212 of the Criminal Code). This last article was once used to ensnare the Secretary General of Laskar Bali when he and a dozen of his members visited the Satpol PP office following the removal of his billboard by Satpol PP officers. During that visit, it was alleged that acts of violence and threats were committed by the Secretary General of Laskar Bali together with his members. For this action, the Denpasar Resort Police then secured the perpetrators and processed them up to court. The panel of judges at the Denpasar District Court, quoted from *Tribun-Bali.com* on December 28, 2018, sentenced the Secretary General of Laskar Bali together with two other colleagues to 5 (five) months in prison. The firm law enforcement carried out by the Denpasar Resort Police on the instruction of the Bali Regional Police Chief against one of the *Ormas* leaders shocked the Balinese community, especially *Ormas* members. After the firm law enforcement by the Denpasar Resort Police against parties who disrupted the billboard control, no *Ormas* dared to interfere with this effort again. The law enforcement efforts carried out by the Denpasar Resort Police turned out to be quite effective in preventing other parties from taking similar actions. According to Roeslan Saleh, the use of criminal law in combating crime is still very necessary, considering that criminal law besides having a repressive side also has a preventive side to prevent people from thinking twice if they want to commit a crime ([Muladi & Arief, 2010](#)). Various examples of law enforcement carried out by the police against *Ormas* that committed violent acts influenced other *Ormas* members not to do the same. The observation by other *Ormas* members of the detrimental impact in the form of punishment they could receive when committing violent acts reduced the intention of other *Ormas* members to repeat similar acts ([Bandura, 1997](#)). Various law enforcement efforts, the use of media to strengthen the deterrent effect, and the removal of *Ormas* billboards and attributes further weakened

the power of *Ormas*. There were no more tensions between *Ormas* that could trigger collective violence.

Judging from the three interventions carried out by Polda Bali in addressing the root causes, the efforts to handle the root causes of collective violence were carried out through three integrated steps. These three steps were through law enforcement, non-penal efforts, and the use of media. This effort is in accordance with the concept of crime prevention by G.P. Hoefnagels. Quoted from the book *Anthology of Criminal Law Policy* by [Arief \(2011\)](#), crime prevention efforts can be pursued through the application of criminal law, prevention without punishment, and the third is influencing society's views on crime and punishment through mass media.

The application of criminal law was carried out by enforcing the law against *Ormas* members who committed unlawful acts. Any *Ormas* member involved in acts of thuggery and other crimes was dealt with firmly without compromise. The state, through the police, must be present to provide protection to its people. The absence of the state would allow humans to freely do all sorts of things to survive because humans are essentially wolves to their fellow humans (*homo homini lupus*). Various acts of violence and other crimes involving *Ormas* could not be tolerated because they could lead to wider chaos. The increased intensity of crimes without being accompanied by efforts to overcome them results in a condition where the public's sense of security is threatened, so the community will become fearful of crime ([Abby, 2016](#)).

The second effort from G.P. Hoefnagels' crime prevention concept is prevention without punishment. This effort emphasizes the preventive nature, namely action taken before the crime occurs. The main target of handling is the conducive factors causing crime. In carrying out non-penal handling, Polda Bali focused on how to narrow the space for *Ormas* to move and delegitimize the existence of *Ormas*. Various flags and attributes of *Ormas* were taken down in collaboration with the local government and the community. All kinds of *Ormas* activities that involved gathering masses, such as birthday celebrations, convoys, and so on, were prohibited. In addition, in order to build community participation to support Polda Bali's efforts in fighting thuggery, Polda Bali regularly held meetings and joint activities with the community. Village Heads, Pecalang (traditional security officers), and other community leaders were routinely invited by the Bali Regional Police Chief to align perceptions on maintaining Bali's security from various social diseases such as thuggery. Joint activities in the form of anti-thuggery declarations were also massively held to show that the police, in this case Polda Bali, shared the same view as the community to fight all forms of thuggery often committed by *Ormas* members.

The final effort from G.P. Hoefnagels' concept is punishment through mass media. This effort, according to most Polda Bali police members, was effective in reducing various acts of thuggery by *Ormas* members which triggered clashes or collective violence between *Ormas* in Bali. Every time there was an act of violence and other crimes whose perpetrators came from *Ormas*, it would be massively exposed through the media. Perpetrators with their hands and feet in chains were paraded with evidence in front of the public and media. This effort not only targeted *Ormas* members; *Ormas* leaders or big shots who behaved similarly could not avoid this treatment either. This effort was carried out solely to provide a deterrent effect to the perpetrators while also giving a warning to other *Ormas* members not to engage in acts of thuggery in the community again.

Analysis of Factors Influencing the Handling of Collective Violence Between Mass Organizations (*Ormas*) in Denpasar City

The efforts of the Denpasar Resort Police (Polresta Denpasar) in handling collective violence, as described in the previous chapter, can be considered quite comprehensive, consisting of legal (penal) efforts, non-legal (non-penal) efforts, and the use of media. These efforts have been quite successful in stopping the recurrence of collective violent acts that had been ongoing during the 2010-2017 period. Since the last *Ormas* clash incident at the beginning of 2017, until now, there have been no further reports or news about incidents of collective violence between *Ormas*. As further explained in the findings, let alone clashes, the very existence of these *Ormas* is no longer visible in society. *Ormas* billboards and attributes are no longer seen in public places. Based on data and statements from the Denpasar Resort Police Chief, acts of thuggery and illegal levies in Denpasar City have significantly decreased now. *Ormas* members are even afraid and embarrassed to show their identity as *Ormas* members.

Another indicator of the Denpasar Resort Police's success in handling collective violence can be seen from the research report conducted by Udayana University and the University of Indonesia in mid-2018. Although the research objects of the researchers from these two universities were broader, concerning the overall performance of the Bali Regional Police during the leadership of Regional Police Chief Inspector General Pol Petrus Golose, the research results also reflect the performance of the Denpasar Resort Police as part of the Bali Regional Police. The research conducted by Udayana University had a different research object from the University of Indonesia. The research conducted by the Udayana University research team focused on determining the attitudes and views of the community towards the steps taken by the Bali Regional Police Chief, Inspector General Petrus Golose, including the attitudes and views of the community towards the performance of the Bali Regional Police. Meanwhile, the research conducted by the team from the University of Indonesia aimed to determine how satisfied the Balinese people were with the performance of Polda Bali while also making comparisons with other institutions. From the research findings that the researcher has outlined in the findings section, both studies showed that the performance of the Bali Regional Police during the leadership of Bali Regional Police Chief Inspector General Pol Petrus Golose was very good, even the best compared to other institutions in Bali. The most prominent performance that received attention and positive value from the community was the performance in eradicating thuggery. The public viewed that the Bali Regional Police had special methods in handling cases in the Bali region, one of which was thuggery and illegal levies that were prevalent in Bali before the leadership of Inspector General Petrus.

Looking from the results of the research conducted by the two universities, the leadership aspect of the Regional Police Chief became the highest assessed aspect influencing the performance of Polda Bali. The Bali Regional Police Chief, with his transformational leadership, had the best achievements in handling thuggery, street crime, including terrorism. The leadership of the Regional Police Chief in the handling carried out by the Resort Police ranks, especially the Resort Police, will be discussed further in the following discussion. Besides the leadership factor as revealed from the research results of Udayana University and the University of Indonesia, there were findings of other factors influencing the success of police handling, particularly the Denpasar Resort Police, in handling collective violence between *Ormas*, so that since the beginning of 2017 until now, there has been no further news of collective violence

involving *Ormas* in Denpasar City. Community support, intervention in *Ormas* through policy changes by the central and regional governments, and propaganda carried out through the media greatly supported the handling efforts carried out by the Denpasar Resort Police in addressing the prevalence of collective violence in its area.

The leadership of the Bali Regional Police Chief became the main factor in strengthening the courage of police members to take firm action against *Ormas* that committed legal violations. The consistency of instructions based on academic studies strengthened internal solidity and increased public trust. Law enforcement not only targeted members but also *Ormas* leaders to break impunity, which is defined as protection from punishment ([Black, 1990](#)). The strategy of maintaining distance from *Ormas* elites and uncompromising law enforcement proved to weaken the legitimacy of *Ormas* leadership. This aligns with collective behavior theory which emphasizes the role of leadership in hindering the mobilization of collective violence ([Smelser, 2011](#)).

Intervention through government policy channels also became an important strategy. Group identity has been shown to encourage individuals to commit collective violence, so the existence of violent groups increases the potential for conflict ([The Cycle of Violence, 2015](#)). Police recommendations to local governments to evaluate *Ormas* demonstrate the police's role as an institutional interest group in the public policy process ([Almond, 1958](#); [Winarno, 2012](#)). Regulatory changes through Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2 of 2017, which later became Law No. 16 of 2017, strengthened the sanction mechanism against *Ormas*, thereby narrowing the space for deviations in organizational functions.

The use of mass media was employed as a means of propaganda and psychological warfare (psywar) to shape public opinion and suppress the existence of *Ormas*. Propaganda is understood as a systematic effort to influence the attitudes of target groups through communication media ([Qualter, 1962](#)). Psywar is aimed at influencing the emotions, opinions, and behavior of opponents in a planned manner ([Daugherty & Janowitz, 1958](#)). The delegitimization strategy was carried out by building a negative stigma against *Ormas* through rhetoric linking them to organized crime, thereby generating public support for enforcement actions ([Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012](#)). The use of propaganda and media also aligns with efforts for social learning against violence ([Colombijn, 2005](#)).

Community support became a key factor in the success of the handling. Initially, low public trust made people reluctant to report for fear of retaliation. The collaboration of *Ormas* with traditional symbols also strengthened their social legitimacy. However, through consistent law enforcement and the involvement of community and traditional leaders, public trust increased. Social participation strengthens legal compliance, in accordance with institutional theory which emphasizes the important role of the state in strengthening public legal compliance ([Tanya et al., 2010](#)).

The massive law enforcement efforts promoted by Polda Bali against perpetrators of thuggery and illegal levies gradually straightened out the norms and culture in society that had long deviated and become normalized. This improvement in conditions greatly assisted the police in completing their mission to eliminate all forms of thuggish acts committed by *Ormas* in Bali. Positive Balinese norms and culture must be revived to become a strong fortress in society to ward off all forms of actions contrary to the values of goodness and truth upheld by the Balinese people. [Chan et al. \(2016\)](#) in the journal entitled "Violence Preventing Violence in Context: The Importance of Culture for Implementing Systemic Change" state that the cultural system and norms in society need

to be placed as the main framework for violence prevention. Prevention as part of handling violence must also involve healthy community communities and be strengthened by the existence of positive cultures. These external factors need to be reconstructed so that they can turn into a deterrent to the development of a culture of violence.

These four factors have a strong role in preventing the recurrence of collective violence between *Ormas* in Bali. The existence of these factors plays a fairly effective role in reducing tensions between *Ormas*, which are the seeds of friction and lead to collective violence. Collective violence is a form of collective behavior that contradicts laws and regulations. Acts of collective violence in conflicts between *Ormas* in Bali indicate a dangerous situation and cause social [division \(Elliott & Merrill, 1961; Parsons, 1949\)](#). Collective behavior by *Ormas* members that leads to acts of violence needs to be handled by the police. Anarchy or violence committed by organized groups requires different handling compared to the behavior of a group of people who do not know each other, often referred to as spontaneous masses, crowds, crazes, or mobs. According to [Meliala \(2001\)](#) in his article in the National Criminology Journal entitled “Collective Behavior and Anarchic Acts: A Police Perspective”, it is stated that for anarchy committed by spontaneous masses, the community itself needs to prevent it, but for anarchy committed by organized groups, only the police are capable (based on the authority in the Law) to prevent anarchy and take action according to their function as maintainers of public order.

The Bali Regional Police, especially the Denpasar Resort Police, with their various police efforts, appear capable of stopping the occurrence of collective behavior in the form of collective violence or clashes that were prevalent in Denpasar City. The factors mentioned above have strengthened the handling efforts carried out by the Denpasar Resort Police, enabling them to prevent the continuation of the stages of collective behavior up to the mobilization of masses for action preparation. Collective behavior leading to mass mobilization for action preparation has several stages. [Neil J Smelser \(1963\)](#) explains the determining factors for the emergence of collective behavior. According to Smelser, collective behavior does not occur spontaneously; there are several stages that must be passed until collective behavior in the form of mass mobilization occurs.

The six stages are structural conduciveness, structural strain, growth and spread of a generalized belief, precipitating factors, mobilization of participants for action, and the final stage is the operation of social control. This sixth stage is actually not the peak of collective behavior. The peak stage of collective behavior is the fifth stage, namely mass mobilization. This sixth stage is the stage that influences the previous stages of collective behavior. In other words, this stage can shape structural conduciveness, structural strain, growth and spread of a generalized belief, precipitating factors, up to the mobilization of participants for action as the final stage of collective behavior. The sixth stage, the operation of social control, is a crucial stage that can prevent or even strengthen collective behavior. The operation of social control stage influences the previous five stages. Some elements included in this operation of social control are police forces, propaganda, changes in government and legislative policies, and other forms of social control.

In the handling of collective violence carried out by Polda Bali, factors that hinder the shift towards the peak stage of collective behavior are implicitly present. The stage referred to in collective behavior as “The Operation of Control” is implied in the factors

influencing the handling of collective violence between *Ormas*. It is stated that the factors influencing Polda Bali's handling of collective violence are leadership, changes in government policy, media propaganda, and community support. When these factors are associated with Smelser's sixth stage, namely the operation of social control, there are similarities. The leader and police forces mentioned in the operation of social control are reflected in the leadership factor of the Bali Regional Police Chief. During the leadership of the Bali Regional Police Chief, Polda Bali was able to demonstrate its existence in the midst of society while simultaneously reducing the pride of *Ormas* leaders through law enforcement actions and intensive psywar. The presence of the police, which appeared increasingly powerful during the leadership of the Bali Regional Police Chief, weakened the position of *Ormas*. Propaganda is reflected in the propaganda and psywar actions carried out by the Bali Regional Police Chief by utilizing the media to undermine and delegitimize *Ormas* in the eyes of the public. Changes in government policy are reflected in the Governor's policy, which ultimately issued a policy in the form of a warning to *Ormas* not to take actions contrary to the law. This policy change was motivated by Polda Bali's efforts to send a recommendation letter to review the existence of *Ormas* based on data held by Polda Bali. And finally, social control is reflected in the form of increasing community participation in supporting police efforts to combat thuggery.

When these factors influencing the handling of collective violence between *Ormas* in Bali are associated with Smelser's stages of collective behavior, they not only eliminate the precipitating factors (i.e., friction between *Ormas* members) but also reduce the structural strain (tension) between the *Ormas* themselves, thereby preventing them from crossing over to the next stage, namely mass mobilization. As such, it can be said that the factors mentioned above have become the operation of control supporting the Denpasar Resort Police's efforts to prevent the recurrence of collective violence. The comprehensive actions taken by the Denpasar Resort Police, supported by the factors mentioned earlier in handling collective violence between *Ormas* in Bali, are also in line with research conducted by [Laurens Baker \(2016\)](#). In his research results presented in the paper "Organized Violence and The State: Evolving Vigilantism In Indonesia," it is stated that non-state security actors who have deviated in their interpretation of security need to be handled comprehensively. Action against non-state security actors that has led to acts of thuggery needs to be addressed through steps such as strengthening social control, using media, the role of the community, and others.

Conclusion

The findings on the handling of collective violence by the Indonesian National Police (Polri) in conflicts between mass organizations (*Ormas*) in Denpasar City indicate that the prevalence of violence cannot be separated from Denpasar's status as the provincial capital and economic center of Bali, which attracted various *Ormas*, including Laskar Bali, Baladika, and Pemuda Bali Bersatu. During the 2010–2017 period, these *Ormas* frequently engaged in extortion, illegal levies, and arbitrary territorial disputes, with a militant attitude that triggered collective violence. Initial police handling tended to be superficial and weak due to conflicts of interest and political intervention, causing the violence to recur repeatedly.

More comprehensive handling by the Denpasar Resort Police (Polresta Denpasar) focused efforts on firm law enforcement against *Ormas* members, diminishing the organizations' existence, and suppressing supporting parties through government policies, propaganda, and psychological warfare. Mass media were utilized as a means of

deterrence while simultaneously reducing public support for the *Ormas*. The success of these efforts was driven by the firm leadership of the Bali Regional Police Chief, support from local government, the community, traditional villages (*desa adat*), and cross-sectoral coordination that strengthened the implementation of handling policies.

Efforts to handle collective violence need to be supported by uncompromising law enforcement, identification of root causes, consistency in policy implementation, community participation, policy intervention targeting *Ormas*, strategic media management, synergy with criminal justice system institutions, cross-sectoral cooperation, strengthening of Balinese traditional values and social institutions, as well as further research in different social contexts or with different groups. This holistic approach is capable of breaking the cycle of collective violence and preventing the potential for conflict from manifesting into actual actions within society.

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